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By analyzing vesicle ﬂ  uids and crusted scabs from 136 
persons with suspected monkeypox, we identiﬁ  ed 51 cases 
of monkeypox by PCR, sequenced the hemagglutinin gene, 
and conﬁ  rmed 94% of cases by virus culture. PCR dem-
onstrated chickenpox in 61 patients. Coinfection with both 
viruses was found in 1 additional patient.
M
onkeypox (MPX) virus is an orthopoxvirus that 
causes human MPX, a smallpoxlike disease report-
ed in the African rainforests. Humans acquire the virus 
through direct contact with infected animals or patients (1). 
To determine whether MPX virus could potentially occupy 
the niche vacated by smallpox virus, the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) conducted an active surveillance pro-
gram during 1981–1986 in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) and identiﬁ  ed 338 MPX cases (67% con-
ﬁ  rmed by virus culture). Epidemiologic data led to the 
conclusion that MPX was a sporadic disease with a low 
potential for person-to-person transmission and that infec-
tion could not sustain itself in the human population (1). In 
the following years (1986–1995), only 13 MPX cases were 
reported (2). However, during 1995–1996, >500 cases of 
suspected MPX were reported, although only a small num-
ber were laboratory conﬁ  rmed (3). In contrast to the earlier 
ﬁ  ndings by WHO, the percentage of secondary cases was 
much higher (78%) and the mortality rate was much lower 
(1.5%). The question was raised as to whether a number of 
these cases were actually chickenpox, caused by the vari-
cella-zoster virus (VZV), which is characterized by a high 
rate of secondary transmission and a low mortality rate (4). 
Although MPX is the only known severe orthopoxvirus in-
fection today, the current dynamics of MPX infection are 
poorly understood and little information is available to im-
prove WHO recommendations for the prevention of human 
MPX. We report laboratory data obtained from patients 
with suspected MPX infection.
The Study
As part of the DRC Ministry of Health national dis-
ease surveillance program, 2,734 cases of suspected human 
MPX were reported from all 11 DRC provinces during 
January 2001–December 2004: 380 cases in 2001, 545 in 
2002, 783 in 2003, and 1,026 in 2004. However, because 
civil war severely hampered surveillance activities, only 
171 clinical specimens were obtained from 136 patients, 
who represent 4.9% of all reported cases. Ethical approval 
for this study was obtained from the Kinshasa School of 
Public Health, DRC, and the University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill, NC, USA.
All 171 specimens (crusted scabs and vesicle ﬂ  uids) 
were inoculated onto MA104-cells by using standard pro-
cedures in a Biosafety Level 3 laboratory. Results yielded 
56 MPX virus isolates from 48 patients (Table 1); scab and 
ﬂ  uid specimens from the same patient were virus-positive 
for 8 patients. Identity of all isolates as MPX virus was 
conﬁ  rmed by sequencing the entire open reading frame of 
the hemagglutinin (HA) gene.
DNA of all specimens was analyzed by using the Re-
alArt Orthopox LightCycler PCR kit (QIAGEN, Hilden, 
Germany), which ampliﬁ  es sequences of the fusion protein 
gene present in all orthopoxviruses, including MPX virus 
(5). Subsequent melting-curve analysis enables further dif-
ferentiation of either variola or nonvariola orthopoxviruses; 
however,  speciﬁ  c identiﬁ  cation of MPX virus is not pos-
sible. We ampliﬁ  ed nonvariola orthopoxvirus sequences 
in 65 specimens from 52 patients (Table 1); all specimens 
from which MPX virus had been isolated were also positive 
by PCR. For all 13 patients from whom crusts and vesicle 
ﬂ  uids were available, both specimens were PCR-positive.
Of 171 specimens examined by using RealArt VZV 
LC PCR (QIAGEN), 78 showed speciﬁ  c ampliﬁ  cation that 
indicated that 62 patients had VZV infection (Table 1). Of 
136 patients investigated, 1 was coinfected with both, MPX 
(PCR and virus isolation) and VZV (PCR). Coinfections 
were reported during the 1996–1997 outbreak (3) and in a 
patient who died in 2001 (6). Whether these coinfections 
resulted from simultaneous circulation of both viruses or 
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to a mutual inﬂ  uence in the pathogenesis of either virus is 
not known.
Data on sex and age were available for 134 patients. 
The male-to-female ratio was approximately equal: 66 
males and 68 females (Table 2). Ages ranged from 2 
months to 54 years; average was 15.4 years (median 11.0). 
The average age of patients with conﬁ  rmed MPX was 10.0 
years (median 7.0 years), whereas the mean age of patients 
with VZV infection was 20.6 (median 17.0, p<0.001, t = 
4.625, df = 109). That most MPX cases (94%) occurred in 
patients <25 years of age suggests that cross-protective im-
munity may still exist; a potential for continued immunity 
has been demonstrated (7). However, this difference could 
also reﬂ  ect different exposures in adults >25 years of age.
The DRC is divided into 512 administrative health 
zones that are within 11 provinces (Figure 1). Consistent 
with earlier reports (1), all MPX patients identiﬁ  ed in this 
study lived mainly in small villages located in or near the 
tropical rainforest, where populations have ample oppor-
tunities for multiple close contacts with animals. No MPX 
cases have been identiﬁ  ed in the area of Kinshasa. In some 
health zones, MPX virus and VZV circulate simultaneously 
(data not shown).
The entire sequence (942 nt) of the open reading frame 
of the HA gene was determined (8) for 48 virus isolates 
derived from 48 patients after PCR ampliﬁ  cation. In addi-
tion, the HA gene sequence was successfully determined 
directly from lesion material of 2 MPX patients from whom 
no virus isolate was available; for a third patient, only a part 
of the HA sequence could be sequenced. All HA nucleo-
tide sequences were deposited in GenBank (accession nos. 
DQ443476 through DQ443525). Sequencing identiﬁ  ed 2 
distinct groups consisting of 29 and 21 identical sequences, 
which differed by a single nucleotide. Geographic data 
analysis demonstrated that this difference was distributed 
consistently between patients living in east and west DRC 
(Figure 1). There were no sequence differences in the MPX 
virus hemagglutinin gene (942 nt) of isolates from the same 
patient. The 2 sequences determined here were identical to 
sequences reported previously (9) from MPX patients in 
the DRC (AF375099 and AF375096, respectively). The 
sequences represent 2 of 5 branches of the Central African 
MPX virus clade (Figure 2), which is distinguishable from 
a second clade comprising isolates from 1) West Africa, 2) 
outbreaks in primate-holding facilities in Europe and the 
United States, and 3) the recent 2003 US outbreak.
For our study, we used 2 commercially available kits 
to amplify orthopoxvirus and VZV sequences. The assays 
contain an internal control to monitor inhibition and use 
4 positive controls to enable quantiﬁ  cation of the amount 
of input genomic viral DNA. On the basis of our results, 
one can calculate that MPX lesion material usually con-
tains several million viral genomic copies (data not shown). 
Whereas WHO surveillance conﬁ  rmed 67% by virus cul-
ture (1), we isolated MPX virus in 94% of the MPX pa-
tients who had positive PCR results. The rather high rate 
of virus culture–conﬁ  rmed cases points to the robust and 
highly concentrated amounts of virus in lesions; virus re-
mained viable in lesions over an extended period despite 
suboptimal collection and transportation conditions.
Conclusions
Among 136 patients, 51 (37.5%) had laboratory-con-
ﬁ   rmed MPX infection, 61 (44.8%) had laboratory-con-
ﬁ  rmed VZV infection, and 1 (0.7%) had coinfection. MPX 
virus is considered to be the most important orthopoxvirus 
Table 1. Orthopoxviruses and varicella-zoster virus, Democratic Republic of Congo, 2001–2004* 
PCR result 
Specimen (no. patients)  MPX virus isolated  Orthopoxvirus   VZV 
Crusts (50)  16 18 21
Vesicle fluid (51)  19 21 24
Crusts and vesicle fluid (35)  8 and 5†  13‡ 17‡
Total (136)   48 52 62
*MPX, monkeypox; VZV, varicella-zoster virus. 
†Virus was isolated from both specimens from 8 patients and from either specimen from 5 patients.  
‡Both specimens were positive by PCR. 
Table 2. Age and sex distribution of patients with monkeypox or chickenpox, Democratic Republic of Congo, 2001–2004* 
Age, y 
No. cases investigated 
male/female, n = 134 
MPX-positive
male/female, n = 51 
VZV-positive
male/female, n = 61 
<4 12/21 8/7 3/6
5–14 22/19 12/9 7/8
15–24 17/13 5/7† 10/5†
25–34 9/8 2/0 5/6
>35 6/7 1/0 5/6
Total 66/68 28/23 30/31
*MPX, monkeypox; VZV, varicella-zoster virus. 
†Coinfection with MPX and VZV in a 17-year-old female patient. DISPATCHES
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infection in humans because it causes disease clinically in-
distinguishable from smallpox. Recent outbreaks of MPX 
in the United States (13), the Republic of Congo (14) and 
Sudan (15) highlight the capacity of this virus to appear 
where it has never before been reported. Because clinically, 
MPX is often confused with chickenpox, laboratory diag-
nosis is critical to determine whether a suspected case is 
indeed MPX. In our study, we identiﬁ  ed the causative agent 
for a rash-causing illness in 83% of all patients. We have 
recently strengthened the MPX surveillance program to im-
prove understanding of the epidemiology of human MPX.
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